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ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE
CONGLOMERATE MERGER
CHARLES H. BERRY*
The 1968 White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy (Neal
Task Force Report) released earlier this year by the Department of Justice
contains a proposed Merger Act.1 This act would declare presumptively un-
lawful any conglomerate merger-in fact all mergers- in which a large
firm acquires, directly or indirectly, control of the assets of a leading firm
in any market in which the total sales of all firms amount to $100 million
or more annually. A large firm is defined by the Neal Task Force Report as
one with annual sales of at least $500 million or assets of $250 million; a
leading firm is one with a market share of 10 percent or more, provided
that firm is also among the four largest in the industry in question, and
that the combined market share of those four firms is at least 50 percent.2
On the surface, this recommendation of the Task Force is strikingly
similar to one put forward a year earlier by James S. Campbell and
William G. Shepherd.3 The Campbell-Shepherd proposal would bar any
merger between leading firms, not just the acquisition of a leading-firm
by a large firm. According to Campbell and Shepherd, a leading firm merger
is one linking two firms each of which is large within a concentrated
industry. By large, they mean a firm with a market share of at least 10
per cent which is among "the three to six largest firms in an industry ..."
and by a concentrated industry "one in which the 4-firm concentration ratio
is above 40 percent .... -"4 Both the Campbell-Shepherd proposal and the
Neal Task Force Report would exempt industries with sales of less than
$100 million.
In each case, the argument for the proposal relies on the need to
"channel" or "direct" the interindustry activity of large corporations in a
competitive direction. In the words of the Task Force: "Our proposal.. •
is intended to channel the potential competition of large firms along lines
that are conducive to reducing levels of concentration in the American
economy. '" 5 According to Campbell and Shepherd: "Our rule . . . does
*Associate Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of
Public International Affairs, Princeton University. B.Sc., McGill University, 1951; M.Sc.,
University of Connecticut, 1953; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1956.
1 1968 WHITE HousE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY [hereinafter cited as
NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT], 115 CONG. REc. 5651 (daily ed. May 27, 1969).
2 Id.
3 Campbell & Shepherd, Leading Firm Conglomerate Mergers, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
1361 (1968). Neither author was a member of the Task Force which reported on July 5,
1968, and hence the Task Force did not have access to the published article at that time.
4 Id. at 1363-64.
5 NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT at 5646.
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not bar mergers between firms in certain industries but merely redirects
merger activity toward lesser finns and away from leading firms." 6
Be that as it may, neither proposal is without its critics, and, indeed,
Robert Bork, a Task Force member, dissents from the majority report as
follows:
This statute may easily be shown to be a prescription for decreasing
the consumer benefits that conglomerate acquisitions are capable of creat-
ing. A conglomerate acquisition is not a way of creating monopoly power.
It adds nothing to the market share of the acquired firm and any monopoly
position that firm may already have will be paid for in the purchase price.
The investment will provide only a competitive return unless the acquiring
firm can bring efficiences to the acquired firm. If this is so, the acquiring
firm's choice of one firm in the industry rather than another as a merger
partner must be dictated by considerations of efficiency potential. Thus
the statute will either shift the acquisition to a less preferred firm, causing
a decrease in the efficiencies realized, or cause the abandonment of any
plan to acquire a unit in that industry, causing a complete loss of expected
efficiencies. 7
This paper will argue that as conglomerate mergers are presently defined,
Bork is wrong. Such mergers can be a way, if not of creating market power,
certainly of augmenting such power, and that to define conglomerate
mergers in such a way as to make Bork correct is to assume away precisely
the merger problem to which the attention of both the Task Force and
Campbell-Shepherd was directed.8
The argument presented here tends in general, though not without
qualification, to support the recommendation of the Neal Task Force
Report, although the underlying analysis is spelled out somewhat differently.
The focus of that analysis is exclusively upon the effect of conglomerate
and other mergers with respect to market power.9 This is only one aspect
of the conglomerate merger movement. Such mergers may be motivated by
a wide range of other considerations - tax advantages, opportunities for
leverage in securities markets, the desire of corporate managers for leverage
in securities markets, the desire of corporate managers for growth for its
6 Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1379.
7 NEAL TASK FoRGE REPORT at 5658 (emphasis added).
8 Conglomerate mergers, as defined by the Federal Trade Commission, include far
more than the merger of unrelated firms. A "product etxension merger," for example,
which is a conglomerate merger according to the FTC, is a merger in which "the acquiring
and acquired companies are functionally related in production and/or distribution but
sell products which do not compete directly with one another . . . a merger between a
soap manufacturer and bleach manufacturer .... " See BUREAU OF ECONOMIcS, FTC, LARGE
MERGERS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING 6-7 (1969).
9 The term market power is used throughout this paper as defined by Kaysen and
Turner:
Where firms can persistently behave over substantial periods of time in a manner
which differs from the behavior that the competitive market would impose on
competitive firms facing similar cost and demand conditions, they can be identified
as possessing market power.
C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST PoLIcY 8 (1959).
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own sake, and so forth. The focus of this paper is therefore narrow, but
nevertheless relevant to any overall assessment of the economic effects of
mergers of this sort.
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CONGLOMERATES
From the standpoint of economics, most public policy toward the non-
regulated corporate sector of the United States has, of course, been primarily
concerned with the maintenance or promotion of an acceptable degree of
competition. Competition is a market oriented concept. The failure, both
of economics and of existing legal institutions, to deal definitively with
either the conglomerate corporation or the conglomerate merger can be
largely attributed to the fact that the conglomerate firm, by definition, does
not operate in a single market. The acquisition by a manufacturing corpora-
tion of facilities in markets apparently unrelated to those of its present
manufacturing activity is not a pattern of behavior either projected by
traditional economic theory or readily prevented under the provisions of
existing antitrust law.'0 The conglomerate merger, like the question of
corporate size per se, is a development to which much public attention has
been directed, but about which economics has had little to say." At this
level, Bork is correct. If markets are unrelated, the conglomerate merger is
not a device for the creation of market power, just as the market power of
a corporation is not to be read directly from the absolute size of that cor-
poration without reference to its market position.
The obvious point, of course, is that markets as defined both in eco-
nomics and in law are not independent. 12 Products of different "markets"
can be competitive, and such markets cannot be viewed as isolated islands
within which the competitive climate is to be judged exclusively by local
geography. Even more important in the present context, however, no market
will be effectively monopolized without the presence of some barrier pre-
venting or inhibiting the entry of competing firms.' 8 Similarly, the effective-
ness of tacit or other agreements in restraint of trade among firms within
an industry is equally dependent on the exclusion, by some device, of
(potentially) uncooperative competitors from outside.14 Predatory practices
10 It is of course true that a number of writers have noted the incentives to corporate
managers of rapid corporate growth, including growth by merger, and to this extent the
development is consistent both with the projection of that theory and the constraints of
antimerger law. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GRowT (1959).
See also 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OB-
jEcrivEs IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM 10-27 (1964).
11 See, for example, this rather cryptic comment by George J. Stigler: "If there are
conglomerate firms, I suspect that their chief sins are associated with their massing of
wealth. But the antitrust laws are not the weapons with which to deal with non-monop-
olistic concentrations of wealth." G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 304 (1968).
12 For an illustrative discussion of this point within the antitrust context, see Stocking
& Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 29 (1955).
13 This point is discussed at length in J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW CoMPETIoN 1-41
(1956).
24 See Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
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to discipline or remove competitors within an industry can also be shown
to be increasingly rational the greater the time lag, or the difficulty, as-
sociated with the entry of new firms to the industry in question.15 Competi-
tive structure is not solely, as Bork would have us believe, a matter of market
concentration. This would be true even if appropriate market definition on
the product side were not a problem. The conditions under which entry
will occur, or be anticipated, are equally relevant.16
It is nevertheless true that high concentration and the presence of sig-
nificant barriers to entry tend to go hand in hand. Each, in large part,
stems from the same source. Most entry barriers, apart from tariffs and others
that are directly legislated, are a consequence of scale, and many instances
of high concentration in national markets may also be attributed to scale.' 7
But the concept of scale in this regard is not the usual one. Most of
the serious work in economics attempting to define minimum efficient scale
has been directed to the manufacturing establishment - to the plant - not
the corporation. That work in general, and with some exceptions, suggests
that economies of plant operation are insufficient to explain, or to justify,
much in the way of high concentration in American industry.'5 There is
also the implication that major entry barriers are not generally a conse-
quence of plant size.19 But the relevant scale measure within the overall
context of entry is of the corporation, not the plant, and minimum efficient
corporate size is not necessarily the same thing as minimum efficient plant
size. Indeed, this paper will argue that in many cases significant entry
barriers may be attributed to the difference between the two - and to the
organization and functioning of American capital markets.
THE ADVANTAGE OF CORPORATE SIZE
This argument is most easily made at the consumer goods level. In
terms of major manufactured products, it is increasingly the exception
15 McGee touches on this point, but in the process raises rather interesting questions
about much of the literature of predatory practice. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting:
The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, 1 J. LAW & ECON. 137-43 (1958).
16 It should be obvious that the threat of entry is as, or more, important a regulatory
force as entry itself. As Bain puts it, "variations in the condition of entry may be expected
to have substantial effects on the behavior of established sellers, even though over long
intervals actual entry seldom or never takes place." J. BAIN, supra note 13, at 4.
17 Scale here refers to size. For example, economies of scale are present if unit costs
always decline with higher levels of output.
18 Bain, for example, concludes an analysis of plant economies of scale in 20 concen-
trated industries with "generally, plant concentration plays a minor role, and multiplant
developments of firms a major role, in the over-all picture of concentration by firms."
J. BA N, supra note 13, at 111. Note also that the 500 largest industrial corporations in
1965, as defined by Fortune, reported as a group well over 10,000 separate manufacturing
plants in that year. See FORTUNE PLANT AND PRODUCT DIREcORY (1966).
19 In this context, Bain writes "The general finding . . . is that very important econ-
omies of [plant] scale are found in a rather small proportion of the industries. Economies
of scale were found clearly sufficient to impede entry substantially ... in only 3 or [sic] 20
[concentrated] industries." J. BAIN, supra note 13, at 211. See also Saving, Estimates of
Optimum Plant Size by the Survivor Technique, 75 Q. J. ECON. 569 (1961).
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rather than the rule that the consumer is able by inspection to satisfactorily
evaluate competing products. Frequently with such products the cost of error
in selection is, or is considered, high or significant relative to the price of
the product itself. This point is trite in the case of ethical drugs which are
obviously beyond the competence of the consumer (or for that matter
the prescribing physician) to evaluate. But in other areas as well -most
appliances for example - inspection provides little indication of future
performance and reliability to the average buyer. The availability of repair
services and parts may be a component of that reliability. In this setting,
product familiarity or corporate reputation is apt to be an important ele-
ment in consumer choice. That familiarity or reputation is fostered by
national advertising, and advertising in this context becomes a barrier to
entry.20
Exposure to a corporate brand or name and the concomitant degree
of familiarity which attends that name is independent, or largely so, of
the volume of products bearing that name. National advertising in the
volume required to maintain such familiarity is not likely to generate an
expenditure easily lost in the accounts of a small manufacturer. In those
markets where consumer choice must be made in the presence of uncertainty
with respect to product performance or quality, and where that performance
matters, the competitive advantage, other things being equal, will fall to
the large firm, and competition will be among the few. And that will be
true quite irrespective of the level of minimum efficient (plant) size in the
manufacturing process itself.
For producer goods, the picture is less clear. Product evaluation by
the technical or commercial buyer may be more expert.21 On the other hand,
the ability to respond accurately and quickly to particular specifications is
presumably more important - as is technologically related service. The sale
of electronic data processing systems, for example, is apt to be as dependent
upon the availability of appropriate programming systems and languages
(software) as on the technical capacity and speed of the equipment (hard-
ware) itself. Where such goods are "sold," the product being tailored to
the buyer's specification, rather than simply bought, sales facilities including
the provision for technical service becomes the counterpart to national ad-
vertising in the consumer goods industry.22 In each case, the required
20 For empirical evidence of the significance of this barrier, see Comanor & Wilson,
Advertising, Market Structure and Performance, 49 REv. ECON. & STAT. 423 (1967). For
additional discussion of some of the economic effects of advertising, see Telser, Advertising
and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537 (1964).
21 This point is readily overstated. The complexity of some producer goods may be
more than sufficient to offset any expertise on the part of commercial buyers. Corporations
selling to other corporations not only advertise but also invest heavily in direct sales efforts
of other sorts. It is not clear that those efforts should totally be considered "service."
22 This is not to assert that those services are without value, but only that, as in the
case of advertising, much of the investment in these services may be fixed, i.e., need not
vary, or will vary less than proportionately, with the volume of products handled.
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facility can be used more intensively, and therefore more efficiently, with
increased sales up to some point. That point appears frequently to be
beyond that required for efficiency in the production process alone, and
creates in turn a barrier to entry by the small manufacturer.
This same argument can be made at both levels where product innova-
tion and development are important to the industry in question. The
commercial success of invention appears to be closely tied to innovation -
the actual introduction of the technology in question.23 With increased
emphasis on industrial research and development, the large firm, prepared
to adapt internally the product of that research, may be expected, for a
variety of reasons, to support more successfully the research facility. Those
reasons range from questions of scale in the research function itself (the
so-called critical mass) to an increased likelihood that profitable applications
of research output will be recognized and implemented. Here as well, the
case for corporate rather than plant economies is present.
The extent of these corporate scale advantages is by no means well
documented. In many instances, the nature of the advantage itself can be
questioned.24 Nevertheless, the following conclusions can be drawn. First,
in those markets for consumer goods where the product is durable, or where
failure of the product would impose a cost on the consumer significant in
terms of the product's price, and (in both cases) where the construction,
performance or content of the product cannot be judged accurately by the
consumer, there will be barriers to entry. Under these circumstances, it is
simply unrealistic to expect that firms unable to exploit efficiently tech-
niques of national advertising will populate such markets. Those markets
may also be highly concentrated.
Second, advantages for the large firm - economies related to corporate
size - can also occur in producer goods markets as a consequence of the
more intensive use of sales and service networks and of economies in research
and development.2 5 Where such economies exist, industries will tend to be
the province of large corporations, and the scale of the investment com-
mitment required for successful entry will constitute a barrier to entry.26
23 See Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. EcoN.
297 (1959).
24 Shepherd makes this point when discussing alternative explanations for differential
rates of corporate growth. The setting is a general critique of the application of the
survivor technique in the estimation of corporate scale economies. See Shepherd, What
Does the Survivor Technique Show About Economies of Scale, 34 S. EcoN. J. 113 (1967).
25 It is not the intention of the foregoing to argue that the largest corporation will
have the greatest such advantage. Indeed, much of the evidence suggests that this is not
the case. See, e.g., Mansfield, Size of Market Structure and Innovation, 71 J. POL. ECON.
556 (1963). The point is only that the threshold for successful firms in terms of size
will lie sufficiently above that implied by what is known about efficiency in the production
or manufacturing process alone. This point is made by Mansfield, whose work concentrates
on the larger firms in the industries he considers.
26 The usual argument in this regard is that the cost of capital varies indirectly with
the amount borrowed, and that in this context the large corporation has an inherent
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Attitudes towards these barriers vary. Advertising, for example, can
be regarded as an "artificial" barrier that creates only the impression of
reliability or desirability. Products are differentiated for the purpose of
differentiation, not in response to the actual preferences of consumers, but
the other way around. Preferences are attracted or created by the advertising
effort itself. In this context, advertising is seen as a triple waste: first, in
the resources it consumes directly; second, in the distortion of product design
or content it encourages; and finally, in the creation of an entry barrier
tending to preclude full exploitation of productive potential within an
industry so protected. The implication is that advertising should be dis-
couraged, the most frequent proposal being the disallowance of advertising
expenditure as a deductible item in the reporting of corporate tax liability,
or even in the progressive taxation of advertising expenditures.
27
This question, however, is quite apart from the central theme of this
paper. Here the point is only that in those markets where advertising has
been effective, the large established firm will enjoy the innate advantage of
familiarity. In the absence of, or with a reduction in, advertising to promote
that familiarity, it is reasonable to suppose that alternative techniques,
though perhaps less efficient ones, would develop to exploit the uncertainty
under which choice is made in such markets. The success of advertising is
not unrelated to the kind of products which are advertised. It is not clear
just how significant any reduction in the relative advantage of the large
entrenched firm would be following a marked reduction in advertising
intensity. Furthermore, at the present time, national advertising is a fact of
economic life, and it would be hazardous, if not foolhardy, to predicate pub-
lic policy on its forthcoming disappearance, whatever view is taken of its
economic contribution.
Where entry barriers are linked to established distribution networks,
to vertically integrated manufacturing facilities, or to technically based
service facilities, the problem is further clouded by the possibility that the
resultant corporate scale economies are "real" as opposed to the "artifi-
ciality" of value added in advertising. In some instances, the existence of
integrated service and distribution facilities may be the exact counterpart
to national advertising - investment in promotional activity to differentiate
the product in question with the intention to exclude. Much recorded ex-
penditure on research and development is undoubtedly motivated by the
desire to effectively differentiate and not necessarily to improve. Yet there
is the possibility that this form of organization is in fact cost saving. In
any event, however, an entry barrier will be present, and the nature of that
barrier will be such as to impose higher, perhaps prohibitive, costs on the
small firm attempting to enter.
advantage, not only of collateral but also of retained earnings. See Archer & Faerber, Size of
Firm and Cost of Externally Acquired Capital, 21 J. FINANCE 69 (1966).
27 See, e.g., L. WEISS, ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY 509-11, 528 (1961).
ECONOMIC POLICY
This being the case - and no argument is made here that this situation
is characteristic of all U. S. industry, though it is characteristic of much of
that industry where high concentration is a public policy concern -the
threat of entry by small or even medium-sized corporations is not apt to be
an effective regulatory force. It is much more likely that the most effective
potential competition will be derived from the threat of entry by the large
industrial corporation prepared to diversify. It is to that corporation that
those entry barriers which exist within the industrial sector are apt to be
least important.
THE CONGLOMERATE FIRM AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY
Two views of the conglomerate firm, or of the firm which is becoming a
conglomerate, can therefore be contrasted. On the one hand, the develop-
ment of the conglomerate can be, and has been, characterized as part of a
trend toward increased corporate concentration in industry, with increased
market power, increased exploitation of the distortive potential of mass
media, and, as an inevitable result, a further increase in the significance of
oligopoly structure. The fact that this corporate growth is conglomerate is
attributed, not to (socially) efficient patterns of investment activity, but to
limitations imposed by antitrust constraints on vertical and horizontal
acquisitions.2 8
In contrast, an alternative interpretation would regard a trend toward
increasing diversification by large industrial corporations as one possibly
diminishing the significance of precisely those entry barriers which have
been most conducive to the preservation of market power in national
markets. If those barriers are typically the result, directly or indirectly, of
the size of the investment required for successful entry, if private (and
public) capital markets are organized in such a fashion that the requisite
financing is not readily available, if the bulk of private industrial investment
originates in the retained earnings of industrial corporations, and if those
corporations do not diversify, such entry barriers will effectively protect
large firms in concentrated industries from the competition of small scale
entrants.
If, however, large industrials seek investment opportunities indepen-
dently of their present or past areas of manufacture, the protective content
of entry barriers of this sort will be lessened. In this view, the large conglom-
erate is regarded as a development offsetting in part the failure of equity
or capital markets to provide an acceptable or competitive source of new
investment funds in parcels of the necessary size.2 9
28 See, e.g., Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCEN-
TRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331 (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Research ed. 1955). The role of current
antimerger law is noted by the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability. See STAFF OF
COMM. ON PRICE STABILITY, CABINET, STuDIEs 85-86 (1969).
29 A proposal consistent with this interpretation would be to require either that the
bulk of corporate earnings be paid out in dividends and not retained, or that retained
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These two views are of course extreme. The choice is not between
corporations rigidly and unalterably bound to existing markets on the one
hand, and, on the other, "conglomerates" continuously evaluating new
alternative investments without regard to established market position.
Neither is realistic. But it is equally unrealistic to suppose that all expan-
sion across industry lines by large corporations adds to the competitive
imperfection of the industrial sector.
To put the matter bluntly -and here the argument looks like Bork's
-the most pervasive barriers to entry in manufacturing and mining are
traceable to scale. When entry to industries protected by such barriers occurs
(or is threatened), it will most often be by large industrial concerns. If such
entry is proscribed, either by statute or by corporate policy, the regulatory
impact of the threat of entry to those markets will be lost. Insofar as markets
with entry barriers of this sort are also apt to be concentrated, the regulatory
force of potential (and actual) competition would thereby be lessened in
precisely those areas where its salutary effect ought most to be sought.
DIVERSIFICATION BY MERGER
There are, however, objections to this view. A primary one is that
such entry is frequently, or even generally, not de novo with the creation
of new and independent facilities within the entered industry. The con-
ventional route for the large corporation is via merger. Entry by merger
results in, at most, a different competitor within the entered market, not
a new competitor. The impact of that entry therefore depends on the
behavioral significance of the change in ownership of the acquired firm.
There is very little empirical evidence in this regard, and yet this is clearly
an issue central to the evaluation of not only conglomerate mergers, but
of all mergers. Nevertheless, some insight can be gained by considering the
problem in this context.
For example, the merger of two corporations, each large and each
dominant within its industry, and each showing no sign of present or
impending financial distress, would appear, without further qualification,
to accomplish little in terms of structural change that could be considered
a priori desirable. If the two (or more) industries involved are totally inde-
pendent, any resulting economy would have to be attributed to the superior
managerial competence of the acquiring corporation. This is possible, but
difficult to determine, and a slender basis on which to build a case for the
merger of two large organizations where other adverse consequences may
be present.30
earnings of corporations be reported by stockholders as current taxable income. While it is
absolutely clear that current tax may provide an incentive for the retention of earnings, it
seems doubtful that such a step would in fact markedly reduce the advantage of the large
corporation in obtaining investment funds in large volume. The problem is one of collateral
as well as the source of investment funds.
30 The social loss possible in reducing the threat of corporate take-over is considered
further in the conclusion to this paper.
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Where the two markets or industries are not independent, but linked
either vertically or horizontally, or where there is a technological overlap
in the production process, or where common marketing facilities might be
employed, there is of course the possibility that the combination may
generate increased efficiency. But there is also the possibility that such a
merger would carry with it the possibility that real or potential competi-
tion between the merging firms would be eliminated. If each firm is large,
and if an economy of joint operation is present, each, in the absence of
merger, is a prime candidate for entry to the market of the other. It is
precisely the possibility of increased efficiency from joint operation that
creates the possibility that competition will be lessened by such merger.
Indeed, to carry the argument to its extreme, the desire of two such large
firms to merge might well serve as an indication that an economy of joint
operation is present, and that one result of such a merger would be the
elimination of entry that might otherwise have occurred. 31 Hence in both
cases- either where markets are unrelated or where some interrelation is
present - the merger of large dominant firms has little to recommend it.
The exception occurs when one party to the merger is failing. In such a
case, however, the failing corporation is unlikely to be dominant, and in
addition, the combination can be regarded as much a liquidation as a merger.
On the other hand, where one of the merging firms is small, there are
additional factors to be taken into account. For the smaller firm, access to
the retained earnings of the larger merging partner may provide the counter-
part in investment funds which, through the merger, are made available
at rates favorable to those obtainable elsewhere. In addition, or alterna-
tively, the merger may establish for the product(s) of the smaller firm access
to national markets and merchandising - the acquisition of a known cor-
porate name - at costs less than those which would be incurred by a repli-
cation of the facilities of the large firm even were that feasible. A similar
possibility exists if further development in the industry of the smaller firm
would require a technological base which is readily incorporated into the
current operations of the larger merger partner.3 2
Correspondingly, from the larger firm's point of view, the acquisition of
a small corporation, already active in an industry where economies from
joint operation are possible, can be a relatively inexpensive means of obtain-
31 Note that this framework is consistent with the desire to "channel" merger activity
expressed both by the Neal Task Force Report and by the Campbell-Shepherd proposal.
There is one difference, however. The foregoing relies heavily on the possibility that
mergers between large corporations may frequently be motivated by economies of joint
operation, and hence that potential competition between the two is likely to be an im-
portant consideration. Both the Task Force and Campbell-Shepherd proposals, on the
other hand, seek more to push the investment activity of large corporations toward smaller
firms with the object of lessening industrial concentration.
32 These advantages are, of course, exactly those advantages that might be realized in
the case of a merger between two large corporations. The point, however, is that a large
corporation is apt already to have the capacity to create the joint facility internally - or
by the acquisition of a small corporation - which is an option which the small corporation
may not have or has to a small degree.
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ing the institutional knowledge and some of the managerial skills and
personnel which would be required even for entry de novo. The merger
may thus be a means of minimizing the acquisition costs of facilities that
would be required in any event. No new firm is added to the industry, but
if, as is suggested above, there are economies created by the merger, the
small firm whose ownership has changed should be in an improved comped-
tive position within its market.
Where that firm is small within that market, it is difficult to argue
that the result is a lessening of competition. The converse is more likely.
At the very least, the change in this regard is negligible. Both (or all) markets
involved behave much as they would have otherwise. Expected economies
from joint operation do not materialize. The industries are independent in
the sense outlined earlier. Some corporate growth by merger has occurred.
Entry by the larger corporation to the market(s) of the smaller has been
facilitated to the extent that the merger was less costly than equivalent
entry de novo.
What this says is that the acquisition of minor market position by
merger in a new industry by even a large firm active in a related industry
can be considered entry. Any anticompetitive effects are negligible. Entry,
or the threat of entry, may be facilitated by such mergers. The regulatory
power of the potential competition of large corporations may be increased
by such merger activity.83
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MERGER POLICY
Curiously enough, this suggests that the contemporary interpretation of
antimerger law is not out of place in dealing with conglomerate mergers.
Where two corporations with products actively competing in the same (hor-
izontal) market merge, the effect is clearly the removal of a competitor from
the market. If neither is failing - as would be likely in the presence of scale
economies- lessening of competition can reasonably be inferred. The po-
tential damage from the prohibition of such a merger is chiefly that the
possible development of a larger, more efficient firm is delayed, and restricted
to the outcome of internal growth (and decline) by the corporations in-
volved. The danger of permitting such a merger is the development, unjusti-
fied by economic considerations, of a market structure conducive to patterns
of oligopoly behavior within the industry. That danger is clearly greater the
more concentrated the market to begin with, and the larger the size within
that market of the firms proposing to merge. Within that framework, a
judgment regarding the possibility or probability of a substantial lessening
of competition can be made. It has been made restrictively in recent years. 4
33 Throughout this discussion, equity considerations relating to the owners of closely
held corporations have been and are ignored. This point is considered by Turner. See
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAM. L. Rav. 131S
(1965).
84 See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
ECONOMIC POLICY
With vertical mergers, the situation is not vastly different. Where nei-
ther market is highly concentrated, and where the merging firms are each
small within their respective markets, the probability of a substantial lessen-
ing of competition as a result of the merger is low. Where, however, the
merging firms are large- and the concept of size is obviously a subjective
one - the courts have regarded the merger as likely to foreclose, or as capa-
ble of foreclosing, a substantial portion of the market for the intermediate
good in question.3 5 The cost to such a policy is that production and dis-
tribution economies which may be implicit in the denied vertical integration
are thereby lost or delayed. Any realization of such economies may not be
achieved by merger where market shares are substantial, but only by internal
growth or by the acquisition of market share which does not pose the possi-
bility of substantial foreclosure.
The danger from freely permitting such mergers - and this is not the
law, but economic reasoning -is that the potential competition between
the parties to the merger is eliminated in the event of their merger, and that
where those firms are large there is a reasonable likelihood that entry would
occur. For example, if economies of joint (vertical) operation are present, it is
likely that each of the two firms, if merger were denied, would integrate
backwards and forwards respectively to gain the benefit of such economies.
Each firm is presumably a more likely entrant to the market of the other
than a firm of equivalent size active in neither market. Alternatively, if struc-
ture at either stage of the vertical process permits noncompetitive behavior
at that stage, that too would create an incentive for entry by corporations
active at the other stage where the costs of that noncompetitive behavior
are borne directly. Merger, under these circumstances, would permit an
accommodation between potentially competitive corporations which would
preserve the opportunity for that noncompetitive behavior. If such mergers
are proscribed, such accommodation is denied.
In this sense, the public policy of vertical mergers has been closely anal-
ogous to that of horizontal mergers. The distinction lies only in actual and
potential competition between the merging corporations; but the competi-
tion is horizontal in either case.3 6
The case of the conglomerate merger is one step removed, but the an-
alytic framework can be identical. With conglomerate mergers, the link
between the markets of the firms proposing merger is less clear than when
35 See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
36 Adelman makes this point indirectly within the context of United States v. New
York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946). See Adelman, The A & P
Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory, 63 Q. J. EcoN. 238 (1949).
This explanation is probably also applicable to a good many instances of price dis-
crimination along functional lines- differential pricing of tires to retail outlets as opposed
to automobile manufacturers, for example-as well as to some illustrations of "counter-
vailing power" as expounded along different lines by Galbraith. See J. GALBRAITH, AMER-
ICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNaRVAILING POWER (1952). Price concessions yielded
by large sellers to large buyers are fully consistent with the ability of the large buyer to
integrate backwards. Call it countervailing power if you wish.
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the merger is vertical.8 7 The potential expansion of one corporation to the
market of the other is correspondingly less certain, and the cost in terms of
lost potential competition associated with such mergers is therefore less
obvious. But it can be present, and indeed will be present increasingly to
the extent that there are economic advantages to combining productive
activity in different markets within the framework of a single corporation.
The public policy of conglomerate mergers ought therefore to be di-
rectly related to the public policy of vertical mergers. In both cases, the
merger is between corporations which are not active but potential com-
petitors. In both cases, the merger will foreclose entry which might have
brought the merging firms into direct intramarket (horizontal) competition.
In both cases, where the merging corporations are large and there are poten-
tial gains from joint operation in the two markets involved, there is reason
to believe that in the absence of merger, actual entry is reasonably probable.
This is perhaps less so in the case of the conglomerate merger where the
interrelationship among markets is less clear, but nevertheless such inter-
relation can be present. It follows, therefore, that the public policy of
conglomerate mergers should be very similar to that of vertical mergers,
but that the definition of substantial market shares should be somewhat
less stringent.
The notion, therefore, ought to be, that no firm capable of independent
entry - a large firm - should acquire by merger a significant portion of
any market in which it is a potential competitor. Were it to do so, there
is a possibility that the merger would foreclose significant horizontal com-
petition in the market of the acquired firm which might otherwise have
developed. The Neal Task Force Report views its merger rule as con-
tributing to future lessening of market concentration. This paper places
greater emphasis on retaining the threat of entry, and on the impact which
that threat, or its fulfillment, may have on the performance of concentrated
markets. 88 Both suggest a rule of quantitative substantiality with respect to
87 This is not, of course, in any way to deny the more familiar argument that the
by-product of vertical merger among large firms may tend to increase barriers to entry to
both industries by limiting intermediate markets and tending to require entry in the
form of a fully integrated operation. Here, too, the focus is on potential competition,
though in this case the approach is after, rather than before, the fact. Note that the argu-
ment that vertical integration requires vertical entry assumes that vertically integrated
firms deal only internally with respect to intermediate products, which is not entirely
the case.
88 Some limited, but highly suggestive evidence on this point is provided by Raymar,
who found widespread evidence of simultaneous activity within the same narrowly defined
industries prior to merger on the part of merging corporations in 58 electrical machinery
mergers classified as conglomerate by the Federal Trade Commission. See Raymar, Con-
glomerate Mergers in the Electrical Machinery Industry, 1969 (unpublished manuscript in
Princeton University Library). If Raymar's findings were duplicated with a wider
sample of conglomerate mergers, they would support not only the argument presented
here, but also the possibility that the present section 7 might have wider applicability in
the case of "conglomerate" mergers than has been generally assumed. His is an important
contribution.
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market shares acquired by large corporations without regard to the market
position of the acquiring corporation. The policy problem is one of selecting
such a rule without destroying the beneficial effects of the conglomerate
merger generally.
CONCLUSION
This paper considers initially the recommendations of both the Neal
Task Force Report and of James Campbell and William Shepherd that
merger law be amended or augmented to proscribe mergers between firms
large in their respective industries. This recommendation is contrasted with
that of Robert Bork who concludes that the conglomerate merger is in-
capable of creating market power, and that the implementation of such a
rule would impose needless social cost in preventing efficiency generating
consolidations.
This paper is critical of Bork's position on two levels. First, if conglom-
erate mergers are to be impotent in the creation of market power, industries
must be defined as totally independent, both in production and in con-
sumption.39 As conglomerate mergers are currently defined, this is simply
not the case, and the present state of economic science is simply not up to
the application of such a definition in any case. A conglomerate merger
between two firms producing substitute products - each with market power
in its own industry - would presumably increase the degree of market
power in both markets. Such a merger would be considered horizontal if the
products were close substitutes. A conglomerate merger involving more dis-
tant substitutes would have the same qualitative implications for the affected
industries. This point, however, is partly one of terminology.
More important is the role that such mergers play in the dynamics of
industry structure. It is the thesis of this paper that market power will not
be preserved in the absence of effective barriers to entry, and that most such
barriers are in one way or other a consequence of corporate scale require-
ments for successful operation in the industries protected by such barriers.
There is the further assertion that the large industrial corporation is an
institution uniquely suited to surmount such barriers. If this is so, the con-
glomerate merger can create market power through the elimination by
agreement of entry threats as they arise. The threatened firm and the threat-
ening firm agree to merge. Established market position is protected. No new
competitor is added to the industry.
The appropriate action would, therefore, appear to be to seek to retain
the benefits of the large firm as a potential (or actual) entrant, while avoiding
those attributes of the conglomerate merger which may augment or per-
petuate existing market power. Both the Task Force and Campbell-Shepherd
proposals have sought to accomplish this. Of the two proposals, that of
39 In technical terms, the cross-price elasticity both of supply and of demand must
be zero.
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Campbell-Shepherd is by far the more restrictive. In their formulation the
merger of two firms, each in a different industry and each with sales of little
more than $10 million, might not be permissible. A firm with sales of $20
million is not large. Futhermore, the threat of entry, on which so much of
the argument of this paper is based, of a firm with sales of $10 million is not
apt to be devastating.
Within the framework of this paper, the emphasis of the Task Force is
more appropriate. The limitation is on the acquisition by a large firm - one
with assets of $250 million or sales of $500 million - of significant market
position in a concentrated industry. To permit such a firm to acquire by
merger a leading position in such an industry would be to remove the likeli-
hood, however large that may be, that the firm would threaten the position
of market leaders in industries where market power may be present. On this
basis, the proposal of the Neal Task Force Report has considerable merit.
There are, however, two caveats which must be added. First, the Task
Force rule would - and this presumably is the basis of Bork's dissent - re-
move the threat of corporate take-over from firms with substantial market
shares. It is those firms - firms with protected market position - which are
least apt to be subject to the pressure of close competition within their indus-
tries. Any check on the performance of such firms must come, under the Task
Force rule, from smaller firms within those industries. The proposed rule
would permit those smaller firms to be strengthened by acquisition. That,
however, is a substantially weaker threat to the mismanaged or lazy firm
than the take-over. This is the real cost of the merger rule suggested. For
this reason, any delineation of that market share which defines a leading
firm must be done with appreciable care. Ten percent may be too small,
particularly in a concentrated industry. That would be especially true if
markets are narrowly defined, as they frequently have been in antitrust
interpretation, and, as is fully possible given the leeway in the Task Force's
definition of a market.40 Although this rule is appealing analytically, it has
very substantial dangers practically, and a case can be made that with
greater emphasis on the potentially competitive interaction among firms,
many mergers which this rule would seek to (and should) block might also
be found to violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.41 That, of course, remains
to be seen.4 2
Finally, much of the argument of this paper relies on the importance
of entry barriers attributable to corporate scale. The large corporation is
singled out as immune to those barriers. The Neal Task Force Report
40 That definition is "a relevant economic market, appropriately defined with refer-
ence to geographical area (which may be the United States or another geographic area)
and product or service ..... NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT at 5651.
4142 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 781, as amended, ch. 1184, 64
Stat. 1125.
42 See, e.g., Barmash, Court Opens Way to ITT Deal That Would Set Merger Record,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
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defines a large firm as one with sales of $500 million. Unless the intent is to
gradually reduce the relative size of the large corporations to which the rule
is applicable, that definition is clearly inappropriate in any long-run con-
text.43 If the reasoning of this paper is correct, a large firm ought to be one
large enough to enter and succeed in those concentrated industries where
independent entry is sought. Any definition of a large firm of size less than
that will serve no useful purpose and will only isolate additional firms from
takeover where takeover can serve a useful function.
It is for this reason that the proposal of the Neal Task Force Report is
much to be preferred to the Campbell-Shepherd proposal, but even the Neal
Task Force proposal itself would benefit enormously from a careful attempt
to examine empirically just what class of mergers would be prevented, just
what corporations would be isolated from take-over, and just what scale of
entry would be meaningful in those concentrated industries to which the
Task Force would wish to channel the interindustry activity of "large"
corporations. The Neal Task Force Report with respect to conglomerate
mergers is an excellent one. The proposed merger law is a reasoned one.
However, it deserves and requires careful analysis, for it might be a very
bad law.
43 The absolute number of corporations covered would increase, with such a rule,
rather rapidly. According to The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Cor-
porations the number of industrials with sales of at least $500 million rose from 53 in
1954 to 93 in 1960 to 195 in 1968. See FORTUNE, May 15, 1969, at 166.
